Is it a neutral concept, unfettered by ideology, or does it actually limit the development of an architectural debate that is becoming more and more pressing, namely the value of ethics in architecture?
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Taste, criticismand judgment All aesthetic experience, whether of art or nature, seems to be informed by and dependent upon an exercise of taste.
We choose the object of aesthetic experience, and often do so carefully and deliberately. Moreover, we are judged by our choices, not only of works of art but also of colour schemes, dresses, and garden ornaments, just as we are judged by our manners and our sense of humour.
By his taste an individual betrays himself: Yet, the relation between taste and morality is by no means straightforward. There seems, in fact, to be a puzzling question as to the precise nature of the relation between aesthetic and moral values, and between the good taste that discerns the first and the good conduct that responds to the second.
If there is no relation, the enormous amount of human energy that is invested in art and criticism may begin to seem rather pointless. The aesthete is one who puts aesthetic values above all others and who seeks for a morality that conforms to them.
Contemporary aesthetics has been less disposed to discuss the idea of taste than that of criticism. But clearly, the two ideas are so closely related that anything said about the one has a direct bearing on the other.
In both cases, the approach has been the first of those outlined at the beginning of this article: Philosophers often distinguish between two kinds of critical discussion—the interpretative and the evaluative—and two classes of concepts corresponding to them.
In describing an object of natural beauty or a work of art, we may use a host of so-called aesthetic terms, terms that seem to have a particular role when used in this context and which articulate an aesthetic impression.
Among such terms we may notice affective terms—moving, frightening, disturbing; terms denoting emotional qualities—sad, lively, mournful, wistful; and terms denoting the expressive or representational content of a work of art, its formal features, and its overall artistic genre—comic, tragic, ironic.
Some of these terms can be applied meaningfully only to works of art; others may be applied to the whole of nature in order to articulate an aesthetic experience.
The examination of their logic has had an increasingly important role in analytical aesthetics. Sibley, for example, has argued that such terms are used in aesthetic judgment in a peculiar way, without conditions i. But it is of considerable interest in itself in attempting to revive a conception of taste that was highly influential in 18th-century aesthetics.
As noted above, taste is, according to this conception, a faculty not of evaluation but of perception. In aesthetics, however, evaluative judgments are inescapable.
Theories avoiding the implication that taste is a form of discriminationwhich naturally ranks its objects according to their merit, are peculiarly unsatisfying, not the least because they have so little bearing on the practice of criticism or the reasons that lead us to assign such overwhelming importance to art.
What then of the concepts employed in aesthetic evaluation? Burke introduced a famous distinction between two kinds of aesthetic judgment corresponding to two orders of aesthetic experience: The judgment of beauty has its origin in our social feelings, particularly in our feelings toward the other sex, and in our hope for a consolation through love and desire.
The judgment of the sublime has its origin in our feelings toward nature, and in our intimation of our ultimate solitude and fragility in a world that is not of our own devising and that remains resistant to our demands. In Kant, the distinction is recast as a distinction between two categories of aesthetic experience and two separate values that attach to it.
Sometimes when we sense the harmony between nature and our faculties, we are impressed by the purposiveness and intelligibility of everything that surrounds us.
This is the sentiment of beauty.But it is in the nature of architecture that it cannot be wholly an act of social criticism; it is, after all, partly a matter of creating a civilizing and comforting environment. Challenge is essential to the making of art, and while it is also a part of .
Architecture criticism is the critique of architecture. Everyday criticism relates to published or broadcast critiques of buildings, whether completed or not, both in terms of news and other criteria.
24 CHAPTER 2 Art Criticism and Aesthetic Judgment. 25 In the second half of the Note that a theme could be revealed in the subject matter or as a concept communicated by the work. H aesthetics art criticism aesthetic experience description analysis interpretation. Aug 26, · Thus, aesthetics do matter: they are the essence of the good life.
If you violate any of Plato’s laws of beauty (or truth, or goodness), then your body will know, and your soul will suffer. There is no point in fighting millions of years of evolution on this point, because it is so innocent, it is so good, it is so beautiful, that there would.
Summary and criticism of the book Aesthetics in Architecture Mohammad Rezaei Afkham M. A., Department of Architecture and Urban Planning, Zabol University, Zabol, Iran. Art Criticism and Aesthetics study guide by Nicole_Zukowski includes 23 questions covering vocabulary, terms and more.
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